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Introduction 
Thomas Baldwin, Nicholas Griffin and Peter Hylton have done much to 
show in what way the idealism of T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley was an 
important factor in the origin of British analytic philosophy and especially in 
the development of Moore's and Russell's thought. Baldwin's monograph on 
Moore, published in 1990, and the monographs of both Hylton and Griffin on 
Russell, published in 1990 and 1991, show not only that Russell and Moore had 
been idealistic philosophers in their youth, but also that idealistic themes 
influenced their later, realist philosophy. There need thus be no doubt about the 
influence of idealistic philosophy on the origin of British analytic philosophy. 
Those monographs leave open a question, though: Is the reaction towards 
idealism purely an immanent development of British philosophy, or were 
Moore and Russell influenced by other, less idealistic types of philosophy? 
In this paper I deal with this question by studying the early writings of 
Twardowski, on the one hand, and those of Moore and Russell in the period 
from ! 899 to 1903, on the other. It may be questioned whether the theories of 
Moore and Russell in that period can be characterized as analytic: they are not 
analytic in the sense in which we call Russell's "On Denoting" (1905) analytic 
in so far as "On Denoting" is a paradigm of analytic philosophy as critique of 
language. Taking a broader concept of analytic philosophy we may call their 
philosophies in that period analytic, however, because at that time Moore and 
Russell consider analysis a fruitful method in philosophy. For  them, the 
analysis of thought is possible through the analysis of language or through the 
analysis of our acts and their objects. This notion of analysis does not set off 
analytic philosophy against phenomenology or descriptive psychology. My aim 
is to show that the transition from idealism to analytic philosophy was much 
smoother than is sometimes believed, because the transition was prepared by 
continental and British theories of the mind. These theories of the mind we find 
both in philosophy and in psychology - two fields that at the end of the 
nineteenth century were not separate. My thesis is historical: my aim is to show 
that twentieth century, British analytic philosophy emerged from a much 
broader field of philosophies than sometimes is believed. Contemporary 
philosophy can profit from the ideas in this broader field from which analytic 
philosophy originated, for example, in the theory of wholes and parts, in the 
way we think that analysis might still be a fruitful method for philosophy, and 
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in dealing with problems around meaning and indexicality, and in the theory of  
judgment  in general. 
At the end of  the nineteenth century, Oxford philosophy was rather hostile 
towards psychology. Philosophers at Cambridge, with their appreciation for 
science as a whole, had more interest in psychology. At the beginning of  the 
1890s, Moore and Russell were students at Cambridge, and their teachers were 
Ward, Stout, and McTaggart. These philosophers are said to have held 
idealistic views, which is correct to a certain extent. But, leaving McTaggart 
aside, Ward and Stout were also psychologists. Stout's important work Analytic 
Psychology was published in 1896, and it was read by Moore and Russell. 1 The 
method of  analytic psychology which Stout presents here presupposes a new 
theory of  wholes, parts, and relations for mental acts and their objects, which 
can be found in the same work, and which can be seen as a reaction towards the 
association theory and towards Bradley's theory of  Wholes and parts. 
The term 'analytic psychology' Stout uses as a translation of  Brentano's 
term 'deskriptive PsychologiC. The aim of  analytic psychology is "to discover 
the ultimate and irreducible constituents of  consciousness in general". 2 Stout 's 
project is essentially Brentanian: in his writings there are frequent references to 
Brentano and his pupils Stumpf, Ehrenfels, and Meinong. Stout stands not only 
in a British psychological tradition in so far as he is a pupil of  Ward: he also 
stands in a continental tradition, where new theories of  wholes and parts 
became an important part of  philosophy. 3 At first, these theories were part of  
psychology and philosophy of  mind; later, they also became part of  ontology. 
The new theories of  wholes and parts, in which parts can be considered 
independently of  their whole, made it possible to overcome the idealistic theory 
of  judgment  which conceives of  Reality as a whole as the only subject of  our 
judgments.  For Bradley: "Judgment proper is the act which refers an ideal 
content (recognized as such) to a reality beyond the act". 4 This reality is always 
the one whole. For Bradley, judgments function as truth-bearers. Bradley's 
theory of  judgment  is not subjectivistic, but a judging mind plays an important 
role in the constitution of  the unity o f  the proposition, for a judging act is 
needed to unite a predicate with the subject. A judging mind considers ideal 
contents, or meanings, which are aspects o f  a total experience or reality, and 
l Russell read Stout's Analytic Psychology "as soon as it came out"; see [Griffin 
1991], 34. Moore read Stout's Analytic Psychology and A Manual of Psychology "with 
a good deal of attention": see [Moore 1968], 29, where he also makes clear that he feels 
at home with the topics dealt with in these books. Russell attended the lectures on 
history of philosophy in 1893/94 and Moore did so two years later [Griffin 1991], 33, 
n.28; 33-35. Further, Russell and Moore had many discussions with Stout from then 
onwards, as they say. 
z [Stout 1909], I, p. 36. 
3 See [Schaar 1991], chapter II. 
4 [Bradley 1922], w 10. 
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predicates these contents of  reality. 5 In Kant's theory, the unity of  our 
judgments plays a crucial role; this unity, and therefore the truth-bearer, is 
dependent upon an act of  combining. For both Kant and Bradley, the unity o f  a 
judgment  depends upon a mental, unifying act. Peter Hylton and Thomas 
Baldwin have shown that a new theory of  judgment, in which the truth-bearer is 
no longer conceived of  as somehow dependent upon any mind, was the first aim 
of  Moore and Russell, when they presented their new philosophies. 6 In this 
paper I deal with the question whether at the end of  the nineteenth century there 
were non-idealistic theories of  judgment  or theories on other topics, such as 
wholes and parts, which had an influence on the new theories of  judgment  of  
Moore and Russell. 
I do not consider all possible influences from Brentanian philosophers on 
the origin of  British analytic philosophy, not to mention the possibilities of  
other non-idealistic influences. I do not explicitly deal with a possible influence 
of  Meinong on the younger Moore or Russell, nor with the influence of  Stumpf, 
another early pupil of  Brentano. 7 The question of  Brentano's influence I keep 
on the background. In this paper I give my attention to one pupil of  Brentano, 
Kasimir Twardowski, who is famous for his work on content and object: Zur 
Lehre vom lnhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstelhmgen. The distinction between 
content and object is not often associated with the writings of  Moore and 
Russell, but it has been of  importance in so far as it influenced their theories of  
objects. Further, Twardowski 's  theory of  objects has a striking resemblance 
with the theories of  objects presented by Moore and Russell, as we shall see. It 
seems not very likely, though, that Russell or Moore ever read Twardowski. 
How then could his writings be of  any importance for the origin o f  British 
analytic philosophy? 
Twardowski 's dissertation on Descartes of  1892 and his work on content 
and object of  1894 received anonymous reviews in Mind, respectively in 1892 
and 1894. Zur Lehre especially is highly esteemed; it is called "an excellent 
piece of  psychological analysis." Both the distinction between content and 
object and the arguments for it are treated in the review; Twardowski 's  theory 
of  wholes and parts and his theory of  general objects are also discussed. 
Judging from some idiosyncratic expressions and ideas in the review, the 
5 Sometimes Bradley expresses himself in a more objectivistic way: "In the act of 
assertion we transfer this adjective to, and unite it with, a real substantive. And we 
perceive at the same time, that the relation thus set up is neither made by the act, nor 
merely holds within it or by right if it, but is real both independent of and beyond it." 
[Bradley 1922], w I take it that Bradley means to say here that the unity of adjective 
or predicate and real substantive is not dependent upon an individual act of judging. 
See [Baldwin 1984] and [Hylton 1984]. 
7 Stumpf's theory of wholes and parts influenced both Twardowski and Stout; his 
direct influence on Russell seems to be restricted to the theory of space. 
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reviewer was Stout, the editor of  Mind. 8 Stout, I claim in this essay, was a 
mediator between the theories of  Brentano and Twardowski and the realism of  
Moore and Russell in so far as Stout knew the theories of  Brentano and 
Twardowski and made them known to Moore and Russell. 
1. The distinction between content and object: origin and arguments 
Although Bolzano already drew a distinction between act, content, and 
object in his 1T'issenschaflslehre of  1837 [w 49], this distinction was not 
common in the nineteenth century. The two-fold distinction between act and 
object was much more usual at that time; it was put forward by Herbart, Ward, 
and Brentano. Brentano's notion of  object is not distinguished from the notion 
o f  content: for him, the object is both part of  the act and that to which the act is 
directed. Both Twardowski and Stout reacted to Brentano's ambiguous notion 
o f  object. Of  B rentano's pupils, Marty was probably the first to put forward the 
distinction between act, content, and object, in an article on the semantics of  
subjectless sentences of  1884. Twardowski generalizes the distinction to the 
philosophy of  mind, gives arguments for it, and elaborates on the notions o f  
content and object in 1894. 
Stout already mentions the distinction in a footnote of  an article published in 
1892. 9 A year later he gives more attention to the distinction. 1~ Stout claims 
that there are two aspects o f  cognitive consciousness (of  an 'idea', which is a 
mental state, act or attitude): I) thought-reference, sometimes called 'objective 
reference', 11 that is, reference to an intended object; and 2) a content o f  
consciousness, which determines the direction of  thought to this or that special 
3 The reviewer makes the following comment on the term 'act': "...we should prefer 
attitude . . . .  this is Stout's terminology (Stout, though, does not draw a to say ' " ' "" 
distinction between a spontaneous act, such as an affirmation, and an attitude, such as a 
conviction). Concerning thinking of an absurd object, the reviewer writes: "The felt 
failure to work out the idea of the absurdity is itself part of the content presented in the 
idea through which is presented the absurdity of the object." The specific terminology 
cannot be found in Twardowski. In Stout's Analytic Psychology we read: "The felt 
failure to combine round and square in one image is itself part of that content of 
consciousness through which the absurdity of the object is presented." [Stout 1909], I, 
45; I have italicised the common parts. Typical of Stout is also the reviewer's use of the 
terms 'apprehension of form' and' form of apprehension'. 
9 [Stout 1892b], 108. 
10 [Stout 1893], 112. 
tl The term 'objective reference' is also used by Russell in one of his Cambridge 
Essays (c. 1894): "besides their existence and their nature, our ideas [= 'mental states'] 
have what we may call meaning. This word is used to denote their objective reference, 
that is, their reference to something beyond themselves..." [Russell 1983], 196. Then 
Russell presents a typical Brentanian idea: what is referred to is studied by Physics; the 
mental states are studied by Psychology. 
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object; the content is called 'presentation', or less ambiguously, 'presented 
content'. Content and object are distinct notions on this account. This means 
that Stout drew the distinction before Twardowski elaborated on it in 1894. 
Two of  the arguments that Stout gives in his Analytic Psychology are 
repeated from the review of  Twardowski's Zur Lehre, but Stout does not 
mention Twardowski. In Analytic Psychology, Stout's first argument for the 
distinction between content and object of  an act is the following: the object of  
an act may not exist, whereas every act has an existing content, because the 
content is a part of  the act, or, as Stout says, because the content is a mo- 
dification of  consciousness. 12 This argument can also be found in Zur Lehre. 13 
Secondly, Stout says that the object may have properties that are not properties 
of  the content. I may think o f  an absurd object, an object with properties that 
are incompatible with each other, but the content which mediates my thought is 
not absurd, for this would exclude its existence. When I think of  eternity, the 
specific modifications of consciousness are not eternal, but the object is. This 
argument, together with the example of  an object with incompatible properties, 
can also be found in Zur Lehre. 14 Neither Twardowski nor Stout noticed that 
these arguments can also be considered as arguments for the distinction 
between act and object. 
Stout's third argument is only partly the same as one of  Twardowski's. 
According to Stout, the content may change while the object remains the same, 
and vice versa; for example, when I approach a tree, the visual presentations or 
mediating contents change, whereas the real magnitude stays the same. It is also 
possible that the same visual magnitude stands for different real magnitudes, 
that is, the object is different but the content is the same. 15 We can speak o f  a 
difference of  objects only if there is a difference of  situations or perceivers; 
otherwise this thesis would be incompatible with Stout's saying that, given a 
certain situation, the content defines and determines the direction o f  thought to 
a certain object. 16 Only the first half of  this argument is present in Twardowski. 
For him, content and object are distinct, because different contents may have 
the same object, they may have the same range (Umfang). Presentations that 
have the same object but different contents Twardowski calls interchangeable 
12 A more concrete form of this argument Stout already gives in 1893: the object of 
desire cannot be the immediate content of consciousness, for there would be nothing left 
to desire if that object itself were present at the moment it is desired see [Stout 1893], 
112t3 [Twardowski 1982], 30. 
14 [Twardowski 1982], 31. 
15 [Stout 1909], I, 43, 44. 
16 [Stout 1909], I, 47. This argument is not well known in the literature on the 
distinction between content and object, but it has gained importance in discussions on 
indexicality. When two persons say 'I am thirsty', we may say that both judgments have 
the same content, but that their objects differ; here, contents are conceived of as 
repeatable entities. 
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presentations (Wechselvorstellungen17); for example, my presentational act the 
thought of  the city located at the site of  the Roman Juvavum and my 
presentational act the thought of  the birthplace o f  Mozart are both presentations 
o f  Salzburg, but their contents differ. Twardowski 's  example, which, to a cer- 
tain extent, is similar to Frege's morning star/evening star example, is clearer 
than Stout's. Stout seems to restrict his thesis to perception, and he deals with 
the idea of  different objects presented by the same content as if it were of  the 
same sort as the idea of different contents with the same object. Although Stout 
drew the distinction between content and object independently of  Twardowski, 
he elaborated on the distinction under Twardowski 's  influence. 
The distinction between content and object is drawn by Russell and Moore, 
too. At the beginning o f "The  Nature o f  Judgment" (1899), Moore contrasts his 
notion of  concept, which functions as object of  thought, with Bradley's notion 
of(par t  of) the content of  an idea. Moore also draws the distinction in an article 
written in 1899, later published in James Baldwin's Dictionary. 18 Moore says 
that the object o f  a belief, a proposition, is not the same as the attribute or 
content of  such belief. Here, Moore is denying not so much the existence of  a 
content; he is denying the relevance of  this notion for the theory of judgrnent  
and for semantics. Later, Moore says that the only difference between acts of  
the same type is a difference between their objects; there is no content at all. 19 
Russell draws a distinction between content and object in one of  his articles on 
Meinong, that is, not earlier than 1904. z~ The argument he gives comes directly 
from Meinong, and Meinong got it from Twardowski: the content of  a 
presentation exists in so far as the presentation exists, but the object need not 
exist - it may be self-contradictory, or possible but not actual, such as a golden 
mountain. 
2. The notion of  content 
Both for Twardowski and Stout, the content is something psychical. For 
Stout, the content is a "modification of  individual consciousness", zl Similarly, 
for Twardowski, the content exists in as much as the psychic act exists. 22 The 
content 's  role is to mediate between act and object; it is that which directs my 
consciousness to a special object. 
17 The term comes from Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre, w but Bolzano defines 
'Wechselvorstellungen' differently. For him, the term 'Vorstellung' is taken not in the 
sense of act, but in the sense of objective Vorstellung an sich. 
lg [Moore 1901,02]; [Baldwin 1990], esp. p. 16. 
19 See Moore' s review of Messer' s Empfindung und Denken (1910). 
20 [Russell 1973b], 14. 
21 [Stout 1909], I, 47. 
[Twardowski 1982], 10, 30. 
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The most important difference between Twardowski and Stout with respect 
to their notion of  content concerns the theory of  meaning. According to Stout, it 
is the object of  thought that functions as meaning-entity. The meaning or 
'signification' of  a word can be determined only as occurring in a certain 
proposition or 'question. Only within such a context do our words have 
signification: 'the man' stands for a concrete individual man differing from 
proposition to proposition. This is not essentially different in the case of  'a 
man' or 'man'; the signification of  such a te rm differs each time it is used. This 
type of  meaning is called occasional meaning; it may be contrasted with the 
general meaning of  a word, which is a condition for application of  that word. 
Here Stout seems to defend a two-level semantics. I do not believe, though, that 
such a semantics represents his position in Analytic Psychology, or in his later 
work. The names 'occasional meaning' and 'general or usual meaning' are not 
Stout's, but translations of  terms used by Hermann Paul. Further, Stout is very 
skeptical about an identical element pervading all the applications of  a word: 
the general meaning is a mere fiction, he says. 23 In so far as Stout believes that 
the meanings of our terms are objects of  thought, his theory runs ahead of  the 
theories of  meaning as presented by Moore and Russell. The difference 
between them is that, for Moore and Russell, a (non-indexical) term has the 
same meaning whenever it is used. 
For Twardowski, the content functions as the meaning of  our terms; he 
espouses a two-layer semantics. The meaning of  a term is a content of  
presentation; the object is what is named by a term. Twardowski says that 
someone who uses a name intends to awaken the same content in the hearer, 24 
but it is not clear whether he really means to say here that the contents may be 
identical, for the content is, for him, a dependent part of  an act. 
Twardowski's theory of  meaning can be criticized because he sometimes 
conceives of  the content as a kind of  object. For example, he calls the content 
the 'intentional' or ' immanent object'. Following Benno Kerry, Twardowski 
thinks that the distinction between content and object is relative. 25 A content of  
presentation may become an object of  another act of  presentation; here 
Twardowski conceives of  the distinction between content and object mainly as 
a distinction between different roles. Further, Twardowski compares the 
distinction between object and content with that between a landscape and a 
picture of  it; because he sometimes conceives of the content as a picture, the 
content is conceived of  as a kind of  object. Besides, Twardowski himself 
speaks of  a double object belonging to a presentation. 26 1 think that we give too 
much credit to Twardowski if we say that for him the content is not an object at 
23 [Stout 1909], I, 216-217. 
24 [Twardowski 1982], I 1. 
25 [Twardowski 1982], 63. 
26 "Dem Verbum Vorstellen entspricht in ~nlicher Weise wie dem Verbum Malen 
zunachst ein doppeltes Object - ein Gegenstand, der vorgestellt wird, und ein Inhalt der 
vorgestellt wird." [Twardowski 1982], 14. 
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all, as Jens Cavallin does. 27 Husserl 's critique that in Twardowski 's  theory 
there is a duplication of  objects is correct in so far as every act has for 
Twardowski both an object and a content, while the latter is not essentially 
different from an object. The primary function of  a content is to mediate 
between act and object. I f  the content itself is some kind of  object, we need a 
new mediator between act and content. This leads to an infinite regress. 
Because Twardowski conceives of  the content as a part o f  a psychical act and 
as a picture of  the object, Husserl criticizes him for defending a psychologistic 
theory of  meaning. For different persons the thought of  a tree can be mediated 
by the phantasm of  a pine-tree, by that of  a lime, or by the word 'tree': such a 
content is too individual to function as meaning-entity. 28 For the same reason 
Moore and Russell denied the relevance of  the notion of  content for a theory of  
meaning. 
Whenever Moore and Russell draw a distinction between content and 
object, they always regard the content as something psychological and 
subjective, and thus, for them, as ineligible to be the meaning of  a term. Stout 
may have had some influence on their semantics in the sense that Stout also put 
forward the thesis that it is not the contents but the objects of thought which 
form the meanings of  our terms. A double-object theory, such as Twardowski 's ,  
is in danger of  becoming a representational theory of  knowledge, something 
that Moore was eager to avoid: according to Moore, we know not the 
representations o f  objects, but the objects themselves. Russell draws the three- 
fold distinction between act, content, and object for beliefs again in 1919:29 the 
content is that which is believed, it consists of  images and is clearly 
psychological. 
3. The notion of  object 
For Twardowski, every act has both a content and an object. Although every 
act has an object, the object need not exist. The object is a unified whole, to 
which we could apply the scholastic term unum. In being a unified whole an 
object is different from all other objects and is self-identical. 3~ For 
Twardowski, the object is a bearer of  different properties; the object transcends 
an individual act of  presentation: different presentations may present one and 
the same object. In so far as presentations are concerned, it is not a relevant 
question whether the intended object exists or not. 31 The object exists, if  it can 
27 [Cavallin 1990], 93, 94. 
2s [Husserl 1979b], 349, n. 
29 [Russell 1969b], 304ff. 
30 "[I]ndem jeder Gegenstand einer, ein einheitliches Ganze ist, hebt er sich gegen 
alle anderen, als yon allen anderen verschieden, und demnach als der, der er ist, als mit 
sich identischer, ab.,' [Twardowski 1982], 91. 
sl [Twardowski 1982], 27. 
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be acknowledged in a correct, positive judgment. The object that I judge to 
exist is the same as the object that is merely presented or thought of. 
Twardowski would agree with Husserl that the same Berlin of  which I am 
merely thinking, exists. 32 He differs from Husserl in saying that there is alsoan 
object when I think of  a golden mountain. Using this notion o f  object, the 
object is a possible object of  thought, but not dependent upon a certain act of  
thought. Whereas the content is a dependent part of  a mental act, the object is 
not. 
Twardowski presents a "metaphysics" - his name for the most general 
science of  objects. These objects are also the objects of  the special sciences 
such as physics. Whereas Twardowski starts with a psychological investigation 
into the different aspects of  our mental acts, he himself says that this 
investigation results in a metaphysics which investigates the object as summum 
genus. 33 Objects are real, such as acts or persons, or not real, such as contents 
or a lack of  something. My lack of  money, which I am thinking o f  at this 
moment, is, regrettably, independent of  my act of  thinking. Objects are possible 
or impossible, such as a round square; they exist or they do not, such as a 
golden mountain. All these objects are 'something'. They have in common that 
they may be or actually are objects of  mental acts. 34 All objects are entia; but 
this does not mean that they also exist. 
What the sense of  'being' or ens is, for Twardowski, is not so clear. His 
theory does not imply some form of  realism. He does not want to be committed 
to any standpoint in the discussion between idealism and realism; such 
questions, we might say, are bracketed. 35 An equivalent for 'object '  is 
'Phaenomen', as Twardowski says. Concerning the independence o f  the object 
from the act of  presentation, Twardowski says: we just take the object to be 
independent of  our act of  thinking; judgment and presentation are directed to an 
object which is presumed to be independertt of  our thinking. 36 The fac t  that he 
does not commit himself to a certain philosophical position makes him hover 
between different notions of  object. 37 Twardowski does not want to commit 
32 Husserl says: "Dasselbe Berlin, das ich vorstelle, existiert auch." [Husserl 1979b], 
353,n; compare: [Husserl 1984], 439; cf. [Husserl 1979a], 305, 308. 
33 [Twardowski 1982], 37, 39. 
34 "Allen is gemeinsam, dass sic Object (nicht das intentionale!) psychischer Acte 
sein k0nnen oder sind..." [Twardowski 1982], 40. The term 'das intentionale Object' 
refers here to a terminology used by others for the content of a mental act, see 
[Twardowski 1982], 4. 
35 [Twardowski 1982], 35-36. 
36 A presentation "bezieht sich auf einen als unabh~ngig vom Denken angenom- 
menen Gegenstand" [Twardowski 1982], 9. 
37 I fully agree with Grossmann, in his introduction to the translation of Zur Lehre, 
that there is an ambiguity in Twardowski's notion of object. Twardowski hovers 
between the notion of 'object' as transcending an individual act, as described above, and 
the object as merely a correlate of an act, so that the object has an analogy with the 
content of that act. 
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himself to either idealism or realism; concerning the question of monism and 
pluralism, Twardowski clearly defends a form of pluralism, in so far as, for 
him, an object is a unity different from other objects. 
Stout's position concerning the objects of our acts comes close to that of 
Twardowski. Like Twardowski, the early Stout starts with analysing mental 
acts. A presentation consists of two aspects: thought-reference or objective 
reference and having a content (as we have seen in section one). As for 
Twardowski, for Stout all our acts have an object. The object referred to, 
whether it be fictitious, non-fictitious, or absurd, is taken to be independent of 
our act of thinking. 38 Just as for Twardowski, questions of existence are 
relevant only when we judge. 39 The early Stout also wants to delay the question 
about which philosophical position he defends. 
Twardowski and Stout have the same background; we may see them both as 
working under Brentano's project. On the topic that Husserl calls 'the paradox 
of objectless presentations', they both side with Brentano. The paradox has the 
following form: every presentational act has (entspricht) an object, is directed 
towards an object, as this is what distinguishes mental acts or psychological 
phenomena from physical phenomena (Brentano's view); it is not the case that 
every presentation has an object, since not every presentation corresponds to 
something existent (Bolzano's view). 4~ Twardowski and Stout take the former 
line, for they say that although a round square cannot exist, it can be an object 
of thought, as it is the presented bearer of properties. The main question of 
Twardowski and Stout is one of (philosophical) psychology: What is a 
presentation, and what is an act of judgment? The primary function of the 
object is to be object of an act; and the primary function of the content is to 
direct our thought towards a certain object. Their central question can be 
contrasted with Bolzano's main question, which is a logico-semantical one: 
What is the meaning of the terms we use, and how can the objectivity of logic 
and (religious) science be guaranteed? From Bolzano's point of view, contents 
are primarily objective meaning-entities. Every act needs an objective content 
in order to make sense, but there need not always be an object. Twardowski 
presents himself as following Bolzano, and especially presents his notion of 
content as being similar to Bolzano's notion of Vorstellung an sich, but, 
contrary to Bolzano's notion, Twardowski's notion of content is psychological. 
Although Twardowski conceives the content of an act as the bearer of meaning, 
his aim is not that of Bolzano; his general conception is a psychological one, 
just as that of Stout. 
Moore's notion of concept in "The Nature of Judgment" is as broad as 
Twardowski's and Stout's notion of object. Everything that is a possible object 
for thought is a concept: a rose, red, a chimera, a number, this, truth, existence. 
For Moore, being a possible object for thought is the main function of a 
3g [Stout 1909], I, 45. 
39 [Stout 1909], I, 46; II, 260; [Stout 1891b], 449. 
40 [Husserl 1979a], 303. 
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concept; as for Twardowski and Stout, Moore's central question is mainly a 
psychological one. In this sense he is closer to them than Russell is. 41 
Moore is eager to defend, in opposition to Bradley, the thesis that the 
objects of  thought are independent o f  any mental act. For Moore, concepts are 
not only taken as independent of  a thinking mind: they really are independent 
o f  any mind. A concept is what our judgments are about; they are the primary 
objects of  knowledge and understanding. The distinction between being and 
existence is also present in Moore's writings. All concepts have being; only 
some have existence. The category of  being is fundamental and all-embracing. 
Moore's distinction between being and existence runs parallel to a similar 
distinction in Stout and Twardowski. 42 Moore's notion of  being as the most 
general characteristic of  objects is parallel to Twardowski's notion o f  ens as 
summum genus. Existence, for Moore, is a concept logically dependent upon 
the notion of  propositional truth (see the next section). This is comparable to 
the idea in Stout and Twardowski that questions of  existence arise only where 
there is judgment. 
Moore stresses that the object of  thought, which he calls a concept, is not to 
be identified with a content, a part of  a mental act or an attribute of  such an 
act. 43 For the concept is what it is, no matter whether or not anybody thinks of  
it. 44 A concept has an independent and immutable being. For Moore, everything 
that is has an independent existence; in this he agrees with Bradley, although 
for Bradley this holds only for the one whole. For Moore, the basic elements of  
the world are concepts; they are irreducible to anything else; they form a genus 
per se. In contrast to the tradition and to Bradley, Moore believes that relations 
are not produced by the mind. For Moore, relations are concepts and in this 
sense they are as self-contained as concepts like red or rose. Moore is clearly 
defending a form of  pluralism, which i sa l so  present in Twardowski's and 
Stout's writings. There is also a difference between these philosophers: 
Moore's theory is more strongly anti-psychologistic than that of  Stout or Twar- 
dowski. Moore explicitly defends a form of  realism; concepts are independent 
of  any mind. Moore's concepts are also different from Twardowski's or Stout's 
objects in so far as they are Platonic, immutable entities. 
Concerning the theory of  meaning, Moore sides with Stout, not with 
Twardowski. For Moore, the objects of  thought are the entities of  meaning. He 
criticizes any content-theory o f  meaning, because a content is either a 
41 Concerning the question whether he was willing and able to lecture on Psy- 
chology, Moore says that he had no difficulty in teaching under the name of Psychology, 
for that was really philosophy of mind, dealing.with topics from the works of Ward, 
James, and Stout: "a good many of the subjects discussed in them were subjects on 
which I had thought a great deal and thought as hard as I could." [Moore 1968], 29. 
42 Hylton, though, sees the distinction between being and existence as one evolving 
out of the Kantian distinction between noumena and phenomena. 
43 [Moore 1899], 177-178; [Moore 1901-02], 717. 
44 [Moore 1899], 179. 
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dependent part of  a mental act or a result of  an abstraction. If  the content is the 
result of  an abstraction, someone has to make the abstraction. 45 We might call 
Moore's  semantics a theory of  reference, because the meaning of  a term is what 
that term stands for, so that meaning-entities determine the truth-values of  the 
proposition of  which they form part. A similar theory we have found in Stout. 
In his publications after 1899, Moore defends a somewhat revised version of  
this theory, for he acknowledges both universals and particulars, but he still 
defends a one-level theory of  meaning, because both universals and particulars 
are what our terms stand for. 46 
Although Moore does not explicitly say anything about the problem of  how 
two different terms may stand for the same object, it is implied by his theory 
that the (conceptual) object of  the thought expressed by the words 'the capital 
of  Prussia' is not the same as the object of  the thought expressed by the words 
'the largest town in Germany'. For, one object contains the concept capital as a 
part; the other the concept largest town. Both complex concepts are related to 
each other, and to a certain place and time, themselves concepts, so that they 
form part of  the very complex concept we call 'Berlin'. 47 
For Russell, in The Principles of  Mathematics [w every individual object 
or term is a logical subject to which different properties can be attributed; a 
term is a unity, it is one. 48 A term is numerically identical with itself and 
numerically diverse from other terms, which means that there is a plurality of  
terms. Further, a term is anything that can be mentioned, and a term or entity is 
whatever may be an object of  thought. 
Like Stout and Moore, Russell conceives the objects of  our thought to be the 
bearers of  meaning. Just like Moore, Russell says that all terms have being, 
whereas only some can be said to exist. Socrates, a chimera, and the number 2 
are entities that can be counted, and therefore they must certainly be. 49 Further, 
Russell 's terms are like Moore's concepts in being immutable and inde- 
structible. There is also a difference from Moore's theory of  concepts in so far' 
as Russell acknowledges terms of  different categories: things, which can be 
indicated by proper names; and concepts, indicated by all other words 
(concepts include relations and predicates). A concept may have a role as term, 
when it occurs as subject of  a proposition, or it may have a role as meaning, 
when it does not occur as a subject. We see that Russell's semantics is more 
45 Actually, his objection is that there is an infinite regress: abstraCtion presupposes 
jud~-nent, which implies meaning [Moore 1899], 178. 
~ [Baldwin 1990], 47. 
47 The example is taken from a review by Moore of 1910; the reviewed book is 
Messer's Empfindung und Denken. In that review Moore says that the two acts have the 
same object, but that they contain acts with different objects. A theory about the 
relations between an act and its act-parts is not given, but seems to be of some interest. 
~s Russell uses the word 'object' in a wider sense to cover both singular entities 
(terms) and plural entities [Russell 1992], 35, n. 
49 [Russell 1992], w and w 
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complex than Moore's, because of Russell's theory of  denoting. The 
proposition in which the concept a man occurs as subject is not about that 
concept, but about an actual man denoted or meant by that concept. 5~ A 
proposition containing such concepts as all men or every man as subject is 
about the object denoted by these concepts; this object is a plurality or set of  
terms (all individual men) combined in certain ways. 5l Some concepts, such as 
a chimera and nothing, are 'denoting concepts' which do not denote. 52 The 
denoting phrase 'a chimera' has a meaning but not a denotation. 53 
It is said that Russell's theory of  terms as we know it from the Principles 
was influenced by Meinong's theory of objects. Apart from the fact that many 
of  the Meinongian ideas are foreshadowed by Twardowski, we should ask 
whether Russell had a theory of  terms before he read Meinong. In 1898 Russell 
worked on a manuscript, titled "An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning", 
which was not published at that time. The remaining parts of  it were published 
in the Collected Papers in 1990. According to Griffin, Russell, when he 
finished the manuscript in July 1898, had not read any work of  Meinong 
closely. 54 According to Hylton, the influence that Meinong had on Russell was 
only of minor importance. I cannot decide here on the question of  Meinong's 
influence on the early Russell, but whatever we find of  a theory of  objects in 
"Analysis" diminishes the importance of  Meinong's influence on Russell 
concerning this topic, if it is true that Russell had not read Meinong at that 
time.55 
Russell starts in "Analysis" by presenting a theory of  judgments and their 
elements. Besides distinguishing different types of  relational judgments, 
Russell says in "Analysis" that subject-predicate judgments make up the 
foremost class of  judgments. Russell's notion of judgment differs from 
Bradley's notion: it is not Reality as a whole that is the logical subject of  all our 
judgments; any term, anything that can be thought of, may be a logical 
subject; 56 when a term functions as an object of thought, Russell calls it an 
idea. Each of  the logical subjects is one. Their being one is the most important 
characteristic of  terms, or logical subjects. It means that every term is a unity, 
and as such differs from other terms; it is countable, therefore. A term has, 
besides a logical role as the subject of  a judgment, a psychological role, for it is 
the object of  thought, and a semantical role, for it can be represented by a word. 
In this sense "Analysis" is a forerunner of  the Principles. 
5o [Russell 1992], w 
52 [Russell 1992], w 
52 [Russell 1992], w 
53 [Griffin 1993], 163, 172. 
~4 [Russell 1990a], 147. 
53 When Russell studied under Ward, Ward recommended Meinong's book on 
Hume's relation theory, published in 1882, a topic in which Russell was always 
interested. 
56 [Russell 1990b], 168. 
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It seems that Russell defends a theory of  possible objects already in 
"Analysis". This interpretation is confirmed by what is said above, and by 
Russell 's saying that every possible idea, i.e., every idea that does not involve a 
contradiction, may be a logical subject - by "every idea" he means "everything 
imaginable". 57 Griffin does not believe that Russell is presenting here a theory 
of  possible objects. He says that the distinction that Russell draws here between 
being, belonging to anything that can be counted, and existence, belonging to 
actually existing objects, is not comparable to the distinction between being and 
existence in the Principles, because it is numbers, relations, and classes rather 
than possible, non-actual objects that are said to have being in "Analysis". 
Griffin doubts whether being for Russell is an ontological category at all; it 
might just mean what can be counted as one. 58 This is confirmed by passages 
from the 1898 manuscript, such as: "By being... I mean that which is involved 
in counting, in saying 'this is one'".  59 It is not unlikely that Russell 's theory is 
not fully worked out yet; we should not forget that "Analysis" is only a 
manuscript. More important, the year 1898 for Russell is pre-eminently a year 
of  transition from idealism to realism. Even if we agree with Griffin that 
Russell does not defend a theory of  possible objects in "Analysis", there are 
enough important new elements in Russell 's theory which run ahead of  a 
completely new philosophy. 60 
The thesis that everything that can be thought of  is a unity, is one (unum), 
and that it is an entity, which has 'being'  in a certain sense, is also implied by 
Twardowski 's  (and Stout's) notion of  object. 61 Russell 's use of  the term 
'being'  in "Analysis" can be compared to Twardowski 's  use of  the term 'ens'. 
These terms do not have the same meaning as the t e rm  'being' as used by 
Moore in "The Nature of  Judgment"; for Moore, concepts have being in so far 
as they are substantial. Russell 's idea that whatever can be thought of  is a 
logical subject is comparable to Twardowski 's  idea that whatever can be the 
bearer o f  properties is an object. The idea that terms are unities, different from 
all other terms, is a form of  pluralism, so important for the development o f  
analytic philosophy. 
Although the distinction between content and object seemed to disappear 
from the writings of  Moore and Russell, it played an important role in getting a 
clearer notion of  object. Both Moore and Russell held that objects are identical 
bearers of  different properties, and that they are independent of  a particular act 
of  thought. As long as the object of  thought was not clearly distinguished from 
the content of  thought, as is the case in the theories of  Brentano and Ward, it 
was conceived of  as somehow dependent upon the act o f  thought. Indirectly, 
57 [Russell 1990b], 168, 174. 
5s [Griffin 1991 ], 279. 
59 [Russell 1990b], 143. 
~o This is not denied by Griffin, as he says that Russell's Platonic realism originated 
in 'Analysis', see [Griffin 1993], 161. 
61 [Twardowski 1982], resp. 91, 37. 
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the distinction between content and object, as introduced by Twardowski and 
Stout, was of  importance for Moore and Russell. 
Did Russell get his theory of terms from Moore? Moore's theory of  concepts 
is foreshadowed in his dissertation of  1898. According to Griffin, Russell did 
not read Moore's dissertation before he wrote "Analysis". Still, it is rather 
probable that Moore influenced Russell's doctrine of  terms through 
discussions. 62 The idea that the object of thought is immutable, which means 
that it has merely an external relation with any thinking subject, that is, that 
terms or concepts are independent of any act of thinking, we can find in the 
Principles and in Moore's "The Nature o f  Judgment" alike, which means that 
Moore, at any rate, was the first to publish them. Although it is hard to give a 
proof of  concrete influences, we may certainly say that Stout read Twardowski, 
and that he shared some of  his ideas with Twardowski. We can also say that 
Moore and Russell read Stout. Moore's philosophy comes closer to that of  
Twardowski and Stout, because he shared their psychological interests. Russell 
says he was influenced by Moore. Further, the resemblances between the 
theories of  Twardowski and those of Moore and Russell are striking. The main 
works can be presented according to year of publication. In 1894 Twardowski's 
Zur Lehre was published; in 1896 Stout's Analytic Psychology; in 1899 
Moore's "The Nature of  Judgment"; and in 1903 Russell's Principles. 
Meanwhile Moore wrote an unpublished dissertation (1898) and Russell wrote 
the unpublished "Analysis" (1898). Of course, there have been other influences 
on Moore and Russell. In his idealistic period, Russell never was such an 
extreme monist as Bradley had been. Earlier influences from McTaggart and 
Ward, and from a reading of Lotze, paved the way for Russell's pluralism as 
presented in his theory of terms. 63 
4. The theory of wholes, parts, and relations 
The theory of wholes, parts, and relations has been of great importance in 
the reaction to idealism, because a new such theory made it possible to present 
a new theory of judgment. Bradley's theory of whole, parts, and relations 
implies that a part cannot be considered independently of  its whole. If we 
analyse a whole into its parts, the result of this analysis does not present us the 
parts as they form part of their whole; this means that for Bradley all analysis is 
falsification. In the end, Bradley believes that all relations, even the internal 
ones, are mere abstractions; all there is, is the one whole. 
In the traditional theory ofjudgrnent, the notion of a mental act was needed 
in order to account for the unity of the truth-bearer. The judgmental act was 
supposed to unify two terms or ideas, so that they become related as subject and 
predicate. Bradley disagreed with the traditional conception of  judgment as a 
62 [Russell 1990b], 159; [Griffin 1991], 307. 
63 [Griffin 1991], 39, 41. 
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synthesis of two ideas, but he agrees with the traditional assumption that a 
mental act is needed for judgment and truth. As a reaction to the psychologistic 
theory of  judgment in the tradition, and to idealism and monism, philosophers 
in the nineteenth century want to guarantee that truth-bearers can be defined 
independently of a thinking subject; this means that the unity of the proposition 
is not to depend upon some mental act. 
Earlier than in Britain, idealism played an important role on the continent. 
Similarly, the reaction towards idealism took place on the continent earlier than 
in Britain. Bolzano's theories in the Wissenschafislehre (1837) form such a 
continental reaction towards idealism - and so do Brentano's theories. Bolzano 
is an outstanding example of  a philosopher who defends the thesis that there is 
a plurality of  propositions which are independent of  a judging subject. He gave 
an account of  the objectivity of  propositions, and, thus, of  the objectivity of  
truth and semantics. A Satz an sich or proposition consists of parts, which are 
independent of  any mental act; these parts are called Vorstellungen an sich. 
Propositions have a special structure which make them belong to a category 
different from that of the Vorstellungen an sich; Satze an sich form a category 
of  their own. This means that propositions are altogether independent of  a 
thinking mind. 
In order to be able to defend such a theory of  judgment and proposition, it is 
necessary to have a theory of  wholes and parts in which it is possible to 
conceive of  a part as independent of  its whole. Although Vorstellungen as sich 
always form part of  a Satz an sich, they can be considered independently of  a 
Satz an sich, and of other Vorstellungen as sich; in order to explain the unity of  
a proposition, a Satz an sich is not to be considered as a collection. Similar to 
Bolzano, Russell and Moore were in need of  such a new theory of  wholes and 
parts when they reacted to Bradley's monistic and idealistic theory of  
judgment. These new theories of wholes and parts Russell and Moore could 
find in Stout's writings. Although in Analytic Psychology the theory of  wholes 
and parts is mainly elaborated upon from a psychological point of view, such 
theories are easily extended to ontology, as we can see in Stout's later writings 
and in the writings of  all Brentano's pupils. As soon as these theories are 
extended to philosophy in general, it makes sense to defend the thesis that 
analysis is a fruitful method for philosophy. 
In this section I present Twardowski's and Stout's theories of  wholes and 
parts, and I contrast their theories with those of Meinong, in order to show that 
Moore and Russell's theories of  wholes and propositions have more in common 
with Twardowski's and Stout's theories than with those o f  Meinong. 
According to Twardowski, everything that may be discerned in an object of  
presentation can be called a part, whether the parts can be separated really or 
only in thought. A complex has material parts; for example, houses form the 
material parts of a town. Twardowski follows Brentano in making a distinction 
between three types of material parts: parts which may exist independently of  
their whole (independent parts) - the houses; parts which depend on other parts 
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for their existence, whereas the latter may exist without the former; and parts 
which are mutually dependent upon each other, such as colour and extension. 64 
Because contents of  presentations can function as objects of  other, reflective 
presentations, this theory of  parts can be extended to contents, according to 
Twardowski. 65 If we analyse a book into its leaves and its binding, we may 
again consider the parts of  these parts: the colour of  a leaf and the front of  the 
binding; the latter parts are called second-order parts of  the book. In other cases 
we might distinguish third-order parts. 66 This way of  analysing an object comes 
to an end. For Twardowski, just as for Bolzano, there are ultimate, simple and 
unanalysable elements. 67 
Every complex also has formal parts. The formal constituents of  an object 
are relations between the singular parts and the object as a whole, called 
primary formal parts; or they are relations that singular parts have to each other, 
called secondary formal parts. The latter are, for example, the relations in 
which the material parts stand to one another - the (spatial) relations between 
the houses of  a town. An example of  a relation between part and whole is the 
relation of  a house to the town to which it belongs. Formal relations of  the latter 
type include those which we call having (the whole has its parts) or making up 
(the parts make up the whole) - these are called primary formal parts in a 
proper sense; and such relations as those of  coexistence or of  succession 
between part and whole, which are called primary formal parts in an improper 
sense. 68 Formal parts are important because they account for the unity of  the 
whole; they account for the connection (Form der Verbinding) among the 
material parts. Twardowski only suggests how this could take place: the formal 
parts themselves are related to their whole, which means that there is a new 
relation, which again is a formal part of  the same whole; this might lead to an 
endless regress of  intertwining formal parts which hold together the parts of  a 
whole. 69 
The formal parts o f  an object cannot be presented without a presentation of  
the material parts of  that object. 7~ Twardowski believes, as we have seen above, 
that there is an analogy between the parts of  an object of  presentation and the 
parts of  the content of  that presentation. A variation of  this principle of  analogy 
is Twardowski 's  thesis that the formal parts of  an object of  presentation find 
their correlate in the material parts of  the content of  that presentation. 71 
Properties, which Twardowski calls 'metaphysical parts', are either material 
parts, such as coiour, weight, extension; or they are formal parts, such as having 
64 [Twardowski 1982], 51. 
65 [Twardowski 1982], 68. 
66 [Twardowski 1982], 49. 
67 [Twardowski 1982], 71. 
6~ [Twardowski 1982], 52. 
69 [Twardowski 1982], 59. 
70 [Twardowski 1982], 87. 
71 [Twardowski 1982], 69-70. 
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colour, having extension. These formal parts are relations between whole and 
part. Metaphysical parts are dependent and irrepeatable parts; that is, having 
red hair as part of John is not identical with having red hair as part of Mary, 
even if the shades of red are the same. According to Twardowski the object is 
not a substance with accidents, but a whole of dependent parts (including 
properties) and independent parts, together with a relational structure. Without 
the parts, nothing is left. Most parts, both dependent and independent ones, can 
be considered apart from their whole without undergoing essential changes. 
Similar to Twardowski, Stout defends the thesis that objects are not substances 
with accidents; for him, they are wholes of parts, too. The parts of an object are 
particular; (being) red, (being) round, or the act of flying are particular and 
dependent entities (only the latter example comes from Stout). 72 Because of 
their starting-point in psychology, Stout and Twardowski conceive of properties 
in the first place as perceivable parts of an object. Partly for this reason they 
believe that properties are particular. This red that I see, which is something 
irrepeatable, is a property. An individual is a collection or unity of such 
perceivable and particular properties. In his later writings Stout calls such 
particular and dependent parts abstract particulars, which he clearly 
distinguishes from universals. 
Stout's theory of wholes and parts also differs from Twardowski's theory. 
Stout does not believe that there are simple, unanalyzable elements. For Stout, 
objects are always apprehended as parts of some whole, although this might be 
a different whole at different times. Although only one side of a house is 
presented, I perceive it as part of the house as a whole. An element undergoes 
transformation when it is considered independently of its whole or becomes 
part of another whole, but this does not imply that analysis is discredited as a 
method. Knowledge of a whole, as a result of analysing the whole into its parts, 
is possible, although analysis does not leave everything as it is. "What is re- 
quired for accurate knowledge is not that the distinct presentation which arises 
in the process of analysis should be identical with the indistinct presentation 
which is analysed, but only that it should adequately represent it.". 73 
An ordinary relation, such as being father of can relate its terms only if it 
forms with its terms a complex whole, for nothing else can bring together the 
terms with the relation. 74 
A whole always has a form of unity which constitutes the unity of that 
whole. This form of unity is a particular property of the whole. The melody and 
its form of unity can be apprehended when only some of the parts are 
apprehended. The form of unity can stay the same while the parts change, as 
72 [Stout 1909], I, 65; II, 199-200. 
73 [Stout 1909], I, 60-61. 
74 [Stout 1909], I, 72. This is one aspect of Meinong's principle of coincidence; the 
other is that there is no complex without parts standing to each other and to the complex 
in a relation, so that these parts constitute the whole [Meinong 1969], 289. 
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happens, for example, when we hear the same melody with notes in a different 
pitch. 
For Stout, the apprehension of  the form of unity of  an object is a material 
constituent of consciousness, to be distinguished from the form of  unity of a 
whole of apprehensions. This idea we also found in Twardowski, who said that 
the formal parts of an object of  presentation correspond to material parts of  the 
content of  that presentation. A parallel between Twardowski's formal relations 
and Stout's form of unity can be found in those cases where all the relations are 
apprehended at once; in such cases, the form of  unity is not anything different 
from the totality of relations occurring within a whole. 75 According to Stout, in 
simple judgments of likeness and unlikeness the relation (of likeness) coincides 
with the form of unity of the whole. Instead of  using the term 'form of  unity', 
Stout sometimes uses 'forms of  relations'; both terms stand for a formal 
relation. 76 
Stout contrasts his position with that of  Meinong. For Meinong, the 
founding parts of a whole can be apprehended without the whole, the founded 
object; the apprehension of the latter depends upon that of the former, but not 
the other way round. Further, the founded object can only be apprehended 
when the subject takes the founding objects together in an intellectual act. 77 
Twardowski sides with Meinong in so far as he believes that the formal parts, 
and thus the whole, can only be apprehended when each of  the material parts is 
apprehended. An intellectual act of synthesis, though, is not necessary for 
apprehending a whole, in Twardowski's theory. 
In Meinong's Ober Gegenstginde hOherer Ordnung founded objects such as 
a relation of comparison, a relation of difference, and a geometrical shape are 
considered to be ideal, higher-order objects, which means that they are outside 
space and time; this makes it even more clear that they cannot be apprehended 
by ordinary, sensational acts in the way the founding objects are 
apprehended. 78 Later, in Ober Annahmen, Meinong distinguishes between a 
complex of  a, b and a relation r holding between a and b, on the one hand, and 
the proposition (Objective) that a and b are related by r, on the other hand. The 
proposition is an ideal object, which means that the objects a and b, which 
usually exist in space and time, do not make up the parts of a proposition; they 
only have a foundation relation with the proposition. In the next section we 
shall see that Meinong's theory of the proposition differs essentially from the 
theories of the proposition as presented by Moore and Russell, and that the 
latter have more in common with Stout's theory of the proposition as a whole 
of  parts. 
7s [Stout 1909], I, 76. 
76 Stout's term 'form of unity' is a translation of Ehrenfels's term 'Gestaltqualit~t'. 
Stout also sides with Ehrenfels in defending the thesis that we do not need a special 
intellectual synthesis to experience the Gestalt quality. 
77 [Meinong 1969], 283, 297. 
7~ [Meinong 1971], 389-399. 
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Moore 's  theory of concepts is atomistic: elementary concepts form the 
simple, unanalysable elements of  the world. Things such as persons and tables 
are not substances with inhering accidents; they are composed of  nothing but 
concepts, together with relations between those concepts. Material relations, 
such as being father of or being known by are external relations in the sense that 
a concept may become thus related without undergoing any changes. Some 
formal relations are internal relations: parts of  a complex are internally related 
to their complex whole, because the whole is dependent upon its parts. A part, 
though, is not dependent upon the complex; an element may also be related to 
other elementary concepts to form another complex, and it would not make any 
difference to it. 
Every complex concept can be analysed into its constituting elements. 
Knowledge of  a thing weobta in  by analysing it into its parts. "A thing becomes 
intelligible first when it is analysed into its constituent concepts". 79 Wholes or 
complexes are to be explained by their parts. The notion of  object as a whole of  
parts, which is also present in Stout and Twardowski, foreshadows the idea that 
the method of  philosophy consists in analysis, as we can see, for example, from 
Principia Ethica, where Moore writes: "when we define horse... [w]e may 
mean that a certain object, which we all of  us know, is composed in a certain 
manner: that it has four legs, a head, a heart, a liver, etc., etc., all of  them 
arranged in definite relations to one another". 8~ Parts can be considered apart 
from their wholes without undergoing any changes; the method of  analysis 
reveals all there is to an object. 8n 
In the same year that "The Nature of  Judgment" is published, 1899, Moore 
slightly changes his position. Whereas in "The Nature of  Judgment" the world 
is made up of  nothing but general entities, in 'Quality',  an article for Baldwin's 
Dictionary, Moore says that there are both universals (qualities) and instances 
thereof. Those instances are not concrete things, but abstract parts of  things, 
that is, particular properties. 8z Such a notion is also present in the writings of  
Twardowski and Stout, as we have seen. Further, a material thing is conceived 
of  as a collection of  such parts [cf. Moore 's  article on "Identity" (1900), p. 111; 
cf. Baldwin's  G.E. Moore, pp. 46-48]. 83 The term 'relation' may stand for a 
universal or for its particular instance. Only the particular instances of  relations 
can relate, says Moore. 
79 [Moore 1899], 182. 
80 [Moore 1976], 8. 
8z Compare: "[T]he greater number of properties of objects - those  which I call the 
natural properties - their existence does seem to me to be independent of the existence 
of those objects. They are, in fact, rather parts of which the object is made up than mere 
predicates which attach to it. If they were all taken away, no object would be left, not 
even a bare substance: for they are in themselves substantial and give to the object all 
the substance that it has." [Moore 1976], 41. 
[Moore 1901-02], 406. 
83 [Moore 1900-01 ], 111; [Baldwin 1990], 46-48. 
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In "Analysis" Russell also defends a theory of  abstract particulars. 84 Just 
like Moore, Russell says, in the manuscript "Do Differences Differ?", 85 that 
only particularized relations are able to relate terms; universal relations miss 
the relating aspect. Russell's reason for this thesis is not a very convincing one: 
he believes that only particularized relations can help us to avoid Bradley's 
criticism of  relations as involving an endless regress, but how this may happen 
is not clear. In the Principles Russell no longer defends the thesis that there are 
particularized relations. 
We have seen above that Russell's theory of  terms corresponds with 
Moore's theory of  concepts, in broad outline. Whereas Moore acknowledges 
only one type of whole, Russell distinguishes in the Principles two types of  
wholes. For Russell, a whole is a new single term, it is one; there is no whole, 
though, without parts. One type of  whole is called an aggregate, which is 
definite as soon as its constituents are known. The parts of  such a whole have 
no direct relations to each other; there are only direct relations between the 
parts and their whole. A distinction between relations among parts and relations 
between parts and their whole we also found in Twardowski. The other type of  
whole Russell calls a unity, which is a whole that is not completely specified 
when all its parts are known. 86 All unities are propositions, according to 
Russell. Therefore, I deal with this type of  whole in the next section. Because 
Russell, just like Moore, conceives of  relations as concepts which are just as 
ultimate as other concepts, he is not able to explain in what such a unity 
consists, and how far analysis of  such a whole is possible. According to 
Russell, the terms are what they are independent of  the relation, and the relation 
is independent of  the terms; in other words: all relations are external. In what 
way, then, is there a difference between aggregates and unities or 
propositions? 87 
5. The theory of judgment 
Whereas Stout, Moore, and Russell defend a propositional theory of  
judgment, Twardowski's theory o f  judgment is identical with Brentano's non- 
propositional theory of  judgment: we either acknowledge or reject an object 
when we judge, as Brentano says. 88 "Therefore, we cannot speak of  a direct 
influence of  Twardowski's theory of  judgment upon those of  Stout, Moore or 
Russell. Still, it is possible that Twardowski's ideas had some influence on the 
u [Russell 1990b], 171. 
z5 [Russell 1993], 556-557. 
86 [Russell 1992], w 136. 
87 "The Classification of Relations", in [Russell 1990a], 143-145. 
88 A first step towards a theory of the proposition is present in Twardowski's Zur 
Lehre at the level of content: because all judgments are of existential form, the content 
of a (positive)judgment is the existence of a certain object [Twardowski 1982], 9. 
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theory of  judgment  of  Moore and Russell, namely through his theory of  wholes 
and parts, and through the mediation of  Stout. 
In Analytic Psychology Stout applies the new, non-idealistic theory of  
wholes, parts, and relations to the theory of  judgment.  Stout begins by drawing 
a distinction between the act of  judging and what is judged. The term 
' judgment ' ,  he says, is an ambiguous term, standing either for the act o f  
judgment,  which is "an acknowledgment of  objective existence", or for "the 
objective state of  things which is expressed by an affirmation or denial", s9 
Stout gives an example of  such an objective state of  things: that Charles I was 
beheaded in the year 1649. The example makes clear that what is judged has a 
propositional structure, is expressible by a that-clause. 
The proposition, or should we say state o f  affairs, is bearer of  truth (or 
falsity), meaning of  a sentence, and object of  understanding and judging. A 
proposition is true if the logical subject, which is a whole of acts, states, and 
relations, has the predicated property, act, state or relation as its part. A 
proposition is conceived as a whole whose parts involve objects, qualities, and 
relations. The unity of  the proposition is not constituted by a mental act of  
judging or supposing: it is apprehended along with the parts. Judging that a 
certain sparrow is flying involves the apprehension of  the sparrow, which is 
called the subject of that judgment,  and the apprehension of  its flight (the 
predicate), not in isolation, but as constituents of  a new whole. 9~ These parts 
are apprehended together with a propositional structure, which is a formal 
relation of  agent to action. Stout contrasts these ' forms of  relations' with 
psychological categories: the formal relations are logical categories which are 
inherent in the object of  thought. 91 Even such conjunctive expressions as ' if ' ,  
'because' ,  ' therefore',  ' then' ,  and 'when'  express relations inherent in the 
object of  thought. 92 
This means that within a proposition there are relations on two levels: a 
(material) relation which functions as predicate, that is, as part of  a proposition 
- instead of  a relation we may also predicate an act or state according to Stout; 
and a formal relation connecting subject and predicate. Such a formal relation 
is essential for every proposition; it is a relation of  agent to action, or o f  thing 
to quality. Earlier such a relation was called a form of unity, for it is the kind of  
relation which gives unity to a whole, here a proposition. The parts of  such a 
proposition as that the sparrow flies are particular entities which need not be 
actual. I conclude that Stout conceives of  a proposition as a whole of  parts, and 
that he acknowledges a special propositional structure (the propositional form 
of  unity) so that, for Stout, the proposition is an entity sui generis. In this sense 
Stout 's position is close to that o f  Bolzano; the parts of  the proposition, though, 
are for Stout not immutable: in Analytic Psychology they are thought of  as 
s9 [Stout 1909], I, 97-98. 
90 [Stout 1909], II, 199 ff. 
9~ [Stout 1909], II, 214-219. 
92_ [Stout 1909], II, 215. 
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being the particulars surrounding us, for, in this work, it is these possible 
objects of thought which function as meaning-entities. 
The theory of judgment in the writings of Moore and Russell from 1898 
onwards forms part of their new theory of wholes, parts, and relations. 
According to Moore in "The Nature of Judgment", what is true or false is a 
complex of concepts with a special relation between the concepts. Moore is the 
first to use the term 'proposition' for this complex. Not only the parts of the 
proposition, the concepts, are immutable, but also the relations between the 
concepts; therefore, the proposition itself is immutable too. Every proposition 
has at least two concepts, and a special relation between these concepts, either a 
truth-making relation or a relation that makes the proposition false. These 
relations cannot be further defined. If the truth-making relation occurs, the 
complex whole has a certain property, namely being true; this means that truth 
and falsehood are conceived of as properties of propositions. 93 Truth itself is a 
simple concept, and, because what is simple is logically prior to what is 
complex, the concept truth is prior to any proposition. 
One might wonder whether, for Moore, propositions themselves are 
(complex) concepts, for sometimes Moore contrasts the two notions. For 
example, Moore says that propositions differ from concepts in that they may be 
either true or false. 94 Notwithstanding the latter thesis, Moore's propositions 
are nothing but complex concepts, because propositions are knowable entities, 
and because he says that concepts are the only objects of knowledge. Moore's 
theory of wholes and parts is a theory of complexes in which a propositional 
whole or any complex is of the same ontological and semantic category as its 
parts. Moore's position is, in this respect, opposite to that of Bolzano, who says 
that there is, besides a category of Vorstellungen an sich, a category of S~itze an 
sich; the latter are something of their own kind. 
In Moore's theory, propositions have an, important place because they fulfil 
four roles: they are the bearers of truth and falsity, the meanings of our 
sentences, objects of knowledge, belief, and perception, and objects of logical 
relations. 
The proposition expressed by the sentence 'This rose is red' consists of the 
concepts this, now, red, and rose, together with a specific relation between 
these concepts. By now is meant a certain moment of time, itself a concept; 95 
red  is a simple concept; rose a complex one. For Moore, concepts are in no 
sense mediating entities; a proposition is about one of its concepts, about one of 
its parts. The proposition expressed by 'This paper exists' is about the 
conceptual entity this paper; the concept existence is another part of this 
proposition. If this paper really exists, there is a truth-making relation between 
these concepts. A thing which exists is a complex of concepts with a unique 
relation to the concept of existence. We might even say that an existing thing is 
93 [Moore 1899], 181. 
94 [Moore 1899], 179. 
95 [Moore 1899], 189-190. 
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an existential proposition. 96 If we perceive an existing thing, we cognize an 
existential proposition. 97 We may see the (empirical) world as the totality of 
true existential propositions. Still, concepts do not essentially form part of 
propositions; concepts are self-subsisting entities. 
Typical for Moore's theory ofjudgrnent is that the truth of a judgment does 
not depend upon any relation of the truth-bearer with something else. It is not 
the case that a proposition is true because something exists; something exists, 
because a certain proposition is true; truth is logically prior to existence.  98 
What the mind is and what the world is depends upon which propositions are 
true. The ground for the truth of a proposition is to be found in the proposition 
itself: the parts of the proposition, and the relations between them, determine 
whether the proposition is true or false; such a theory can be called an 'identity- 
theory of truth'. 
Moore says that concepts are the elements of the world; but are they really 
all there is, according to his theory? Moore says: "concepts... stand in infinite 
relations to one another equally immutable". 99 It is implied by Moore's sayings 
that the specific way that concepts are related to one another is a concept itself. 
In the case of propositions, Moore says that the specific manner in which the 
concepts are combined in an (existential) proposition is something immediately 
known, like r e d  or two. Consciousness is a 'transparent' awareness of 
independent objects, l~176 The specific manner of combination which defines a 
true proposition is itself a concept, namely the concept truth. I~ If the relations 
are themselves immutable, substantial concepts, which are independent of other 
concepts, they will never be able to relate their terms, unless there is a complex 
whole of which both relations and concepts form part, and which is more than 
the relations together with the non-relational concepts. Moore, though, does not 
acknowledge such a complex whole. If the relations are not concepts, it is 
unclear what they are, and the world seems to consist of more than just 
concepts in that case, contrary to Moore's assumption. How relations can relate 
their terms is a problem extensively dealt with by Russell. 
In the manuscript "The Classification of Relations", a paper read in January 
1899, Russell says that every judgment is relational, and he distinguishes 
different types of relations. At least some of these types, for example transitive, 
asymmetrical relations, cannot be reduced to (intrinsic) properties of the related 
terms. Even subject-predicate judgments, if they form a type of their own at all, 
are relational, because predication is a relation, according to Russell; if the 
96 [Moore 1899], 183. 
97 This view is also defended by the early Russell: concerning existence, see [Russell 
1990a], 142; concerning perception as cognition of an existential proposition, see 
[Russell 1973b], 34, 35. 
[Moore 1899], 180. 
99 Ibidem. 
100 [Moore 1903], 20. 
101 [Moore 1899], 181. 
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judgment  is synthetic, subject and predicate differ, and must therefore be 
related; if the judgment is analytic, subject and predicate are related as whole 
and part. Russell also makes the stronger claim that no relation can be reduced' 
to predicates of  the related terms. Last, but not least, relations are concepts just  
as ultimate as other concepts (predicates). The question that remains is: How is 
a relation able to relate its terms? I02 
In contrast to Moore, Russell was very sensitive to this problem. Analysing 
asymmetrical relations, Russell realized that a relative situation cannot merely 
consist in the related terms, together with a third entity, the relation. I f  we know 
how to explain the difference between aRb and bRa we also may know what 
explains the unity of  the proposition. 
In the Principles Russell says that a proposition is not completely specified 
when its parts are all known, because the parts in a proposition have some 
order, and because the proposition as a whole has properties which do not 
belong to the sum of  the parts. When we analyse a proposition, for example 'A 
differs from B', we get A, difference and B, which is merely a list of  terms; 
whereas the proposition is true or false, such a list cannot have one of  these 
properties [w 136]. According to Russell, the relation difference as occurring 
in the proposition accounts for the unity of  the proposition, but how this 
happens is not clear. As soon as a relation is considered independently of  the 
proposition, it is merely taken as a term in a collection. Russell does not see 
that we need an extra ontological category: either we do justice to the fact that 
the relation difference essentially depends for its being on something else, 
which means that it is not of  the same category as the related terms (Frege's 
position), or we consider the relation difference as being on a par with the 
related terms, and assume that there are formal relations which found the unity 
of  the proposition (Stout's position). The latter option is not open to Russell, 
because he vehemently rejects the existence of  internal relations. In principle, 
these problems are the same as in Moore 's  theory of  the proposition. A 
difference with Moore is that Russell subscribes, to a certain extent, to 
Bradley's thesis that analysis is falsification, for, as Russell says, the unity of  
the proposition is destroyed through analysis, because the relation difference as 
it functions within a proposition is not the same as the relation difference 
considered outside the proposition. 
Russell 's notion of  a proposition as a complex unity is sometimes compared 
with Meinong's  Objective; for example, Russell himself  did so in his article 
Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions. There are indeed some 
similarities between Russell 's notion of  proposition and Meinong's  notion of  
objective, for both are entities expressible by a that-clause, and both types 
hover between the category of  propositions (meaning-entities) and that o f  states 
o f  affairs. There are also important differences between the two notions. For 
Meinong, a proposition is an ideal, higher-order object, categorically different 
102 [Russell 1990a], 146. 
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from the non-propositional entities on which it is founded. The proposition is 
not a whole of  parts in a literal sense, for in that case the whole exists only in so 
far as the parts exist. For Meinong, the proposition that a round square is round 
exists (besteht), but the round square is an object that has no existence at all. 
Because a proposition is an ideal, higher-order object, it cannot be apprehended 
by a simple act of  presentation. The proposition can be apprehended only by an 
intellectual, synthesizsing act: a judgment or an assumption. Further, there is, 
for Meinong, an ontological distinction between true and false propositions, the 
true ones have (ideal) existence; the false ones do not exist at all. 
For Russell, a proposition is a complex whole of  parts, which is not 
categorically different from its parts. The same sort of  act which apprehends a 
part of a proposition, apprehends the proposition as a whole. 1~ This means that 
the parts of  the proposition must be in the same sense in which the proposition 
has being. Because objects such as a golden mountain may be part of  a true, 
subsistent proposition, a golden mountain also has subsistence. I~ Further, for 
Russell, the difference between true and false propositions does not correspond 
to an ontological distinction; their difference consists merely in a difference of  
properties: being true or being false. 
Stout's theory of  judgment and proposition is more similar to that of  Moore 
and Russell than Meinong's theory is. For Stout, a proposition is also a 
complex whole of parts, and for the apprehension of  such a whole no 
intellectual, synthesizing act is needed. It is therefore more likely that Stout's 
theory of  the proposition influenced Moore and Russell than that Meinong's 
theory of  the objective did. Stout's theory of  the proposition was also known to 
Moore and Russell earlier than Meinong's theory of the proposition, as the 
latter was published in 1902. There remains an important difference between 
Stout, on the one hand, and Moore and Russell, on the other. Stout not only 
sees that a proposition, or any whole, has a unity that is more than the sum of 
its parts, in the way Russell did, but also explains in what this unity consists: 
we need the notion form of unity, or to use another word, we need a category of  
formal relations. 
Conclusion 
The theories of objects and the propositional theories of  judgment of  Moore 
and Russell are not merely immanent reactions towards Bradleian metaphysics. 
It cannot be proven that Twardowski's ideas influenced the origins of  British 
analytic philosophy, but his ideas were known to Moore and Russell in crucial 
phases of  their thinking, through mediation of  the philosopher and psychologist 
Stout. There is no evidence that Moore and Russell knew the writings of 
Twardowski, but their teacher Stout read Twardowski's early writings care- 
1o3 [Russell 1973b], 52. 
1o4 [Russell 1973c], 80. 
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fully. Further, the general background of Twardowski's and Stout's writings is 
the same; both philosophers form part of the Brentano school. The fact that 
Twardowski and Stout draw a distinction between content and object is typical 
of the Brentano school. We may say that Twardowski's distinction between 
content and object had an indirect influence on Moore and Russell. The earlier 
pupils of Brentano conceived of the content as something psychological, as did 
Twardowski and Stout. The idea that the content was something psychological 
formed the semantics of Moore and Russell, too, but in a negative way. 
Because they consider a psychological notion of content to be too subjective to 
function as meaning-entity, Moore and Russell hold, just like Stout, that the 
objects of thought and judgment are the meanings of our terms. 
Also typical of the Brentano school is to give a theory of objects, and a 
theory of wholes, parts, and relations, as is done by Twardowski and Stout. In 
the beginning, the theories of wholes and parts were presented from a 
psychological point of view. Later, they became part of general philosophy, 
includingontology. These theories give a proper place to analysis as a method 
for philosophy. Therefore, Brentano and his pupils can be seen as predecessors 
of analytic philosophy; some of these thinkers hover between analytic 
philosophy and analytic psychology in so far as for them language is not the 
central focus for philosophy, and in so far as their central questions are often 
restricted to philosophy of mind. These new theories of wholes and parts make 
it possible for Stout to present a theory of the proposition as a whole of parts, in 
which the unity of the proposition is not conceived of as being constituted by a 
mental act. Although Moore and Russell do not mention Stout in this context, it 
is not unlikely that Stout's notion of proposition had some influence on Moore 
and Russell; for them, too, the unity of the proposition is independent of an act 
of judgment. There is also an important difference between Stout's theory of 
the proposition and those of Moore and Russell: in the latter theories the unity 
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